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Down But Not Out: How School
Districts May Utilize Race-Conscious
Student Assignments in the Wake of
Parents Involved in Community Schools v.
Seattle School District No. 1
Michael A. Stevens*
On June 28, 2007, the Supreme Court, in a 5-4 decision,
ruled that the race-based public school desegregation programs
in Seattle and Jackson County, KY, which resemble hundreds
of other such programs across the country,1 are unconstitu-
tional.  The dually decided cases of Parents Involved in Commu-
nity Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1 and Meredith v.
Jefferson County Board of Education2 represent the first deci-
sions by the Supreme Court concerning the “constitutionality of
the voluntary use of race to remedy de facto segregation in pub-
lic education.”3  Many view this decision as a clear sign that the
Court is firmly controlled by an energized conservative major-
ity4 and, most importantly, the death knell of desegregation.5
While the Parents Involved decision firmly excludes any
consideration of race to combat de facto segregation in public
schools, Justice Kennedy’s concurring opinion suggests the
practical limitations of this decision and offers school districts
guidance on how to enact constitutionally valid race-conscious
* Pace University School of Law, J.D. candidate, 2009.  I would like to thank
Professor Leslie Yalof Garfield for her insight into this topic; Professor Bennett
Gershman, for providing me with such exceptional instruction on Constitutional
Law; and Professor Darren Rosenblum, for his support and encouragement in eve-
rything I do.
1. Linda Greenhouse, Justices Limit the Use of Race in School Plans for Inte-
gration, N.Y. TIMES, June 29, 2007, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/
2007/06/29/washington/29scotus.html.
2. 127 S. Ct. 2738 (2007).
3. Eboni S. Nelson, Parents Involved & Meredith: A Prediction Regarding The
(Un)Constitutionality of Race-Conscious Student Assignment Plans, 84 DENV. U. L.
REV. 293, 319 (2006).
4. See, e.g., Greenhouse, supra note 1.
5. Nelson, supra note 3, at 295.
175
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desegregation programs.6  Justice Kennedy, the deciding vote
for the majority, found that addressing de facto segregation in
public schools was a compelling interest, but that the plans at
issue were not narrowly tailored.7  In so holding, Kennedy re-
jected the majority’s “all-too-unyielding insistence that race
cannot be a factor in instances when . . . it may be taken into
account.”8
Justice Kennedy’s opinion is the key to understanding how
school boards may be able to continue to battle racial segrega-
tion within their districts without having to abandon the con-
sideration of race in doing so.  This article will examine Justice
Kennedy’s particular critiques of the Seattle and Jackson
County plans, which led him to conclude that they were not nar-
rowly tailored.  Based on the cited deficiencies, this article will
suggest how the Seattle and Jackson County plans may have
been constructed in a narrowly tailored manner.  It is hoped
that this analysis will mirror the efforts of school boards nation-
wide, who seek to remedy de facto racial segregation in the
wake of the Supreme Court’s decision in Parents Involved.
This article proceeds in five parts.  Providing this article’s
public policy foundation, Part I characterizes the issue of de
facto segregation and its effects on the education and well-being
of minorities in America.  Part II explains the development of
the Supreme Court’s strict scrutiny analysis in the context of
race-based classifications and how this exacting standard is ap-
plied to race conscious education programs.  Part III outlines
the factual history of the plans at issue and details the procedu-
ral history of each plan prior to the Supreme Court’s considera-
tion of them.  Part IV details the majority opinion, Justice
Breyer’s dissent, and Kennedy’s concurring opinion in Parents
Involved.  In particular, this section addresses Justice Ken-
nedy’s critique of the plans, which led to his conclusion that
they were not narrowly tailored.  In conclusion, Part V applies
Justice Kennedy’s critique to the plans at issue in order to
demonstrate how school boards may actually implement such
plans in a constitutional fashion.
6. Greenhouse, supra note 1.
7. Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2788-97 (Kennedy, J., concurring); see also
Greenhouse, supra note 1.
8. Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2791; see also Greenhouse, supra note 1.
2http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol29/iss1/6
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I. De Facto Segregation’s Effect on American Education
and Society
The Supreme Court’s statement, in Brown v. Board of Edu-
cation,9 that “education is perhaps the most important function
of state and local governments”10 is as true today as it was in
1954.  Education develops cultural values, enables environmen-
tal adaptation, and prepares children for their professional
lives.11  Likewise, in a diverse society such as ours, it is impor-
tant for children to develop the ability to successfully interact
with individuals of disparate backgrounds in the educational
context.12
Despite the inherent importance of diversity, public ele-
mentary and secondary schools are more segregated today than
they were when the Supreme Court decided Brown.13  For ex-
ample, the average white student attends a school that is nearly
eighty percent white and the average black student attends a
school that is over half black, even though blacks comprise only
one sixth of students nationwide.14  The American population of
whites is the most isolated racial or ethnic group.15  In 2000, the
typical neighborhood of a white metropolitan resident was
eighty percent white.16
As a consequence, racial segregation in public schools gen-
erates long-term balkanizing effects on American society.17
More immediately, racially segregated schools work to the dis-
advantage of minority children.  Minority students in racially
isolated schools have inferior learning opportunities and educa-
9. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954).
10. Id. at 493.
11. Neil S. Siegel, Race-Conscious Student Assignment Plans: Balkanization,
Integration, and Individualized Consideration, 56 DUKE L.J. 781, 819 (2006) (cit-
ing Brown, 347 U.S. at 493).
12. Siegel, supra note 11, at 828.
13. Nelson, supra note 3, at 296; see also generally Robert L. Carter, Fifty
Years of Reflection: Brown v. Board to Education and its Universal Implications:
The Conception of Brown, 32 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 93 (2004).
14. Goodwin Liu, Seattle and Louisville, 95 CAL. L. REV. 277, 277 (2007).
15. Id. at 285.
16. Id. See also ERICA FRANKENBERG ET. AL., CIVIL RIGHTS PROJECT, HARVARD
UNIVERSITY, A MULTIRACIAL SOCIETY WITH SEGREGATED SCHOOLS: ARE WE LOSING
THE DREAM? 4 (2003), available at http://www.civilrightsproject.ucla.edu/research/
reseg03/AreWeLosingtheDream.pdf.
17. Siegel, supra note 11, at 839-40.
3
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tional outcomes.18  In particular, black students in schools with
predominant numbers of black students lag behind white stu-
dents in terms of academic achievement.19  Black students are
more likely than white children to receive poor grades, require
remedial education, and are less likely to graduate from high
school.20  These isolated black pupils are also less likely to at-
tend college, and those who do matriculate at the university
level have a lower chance of graduating.21  As a direct result of
these deficiencies, black children are more likely to be unem-
ployed or employed in low-paying, unskilled jobs in their
adulthood.22
This racial isolation and disparity in educational opportuni-
ties is a result of de facto segregation.  De facto segregation is
caused by “housing patterns or generalized societal discrimina-
tion.”23  The increasing rate of residential segregation in com-
munities throughout the country, coupled with the fact that
many school districts have adopted the neighborhood school
theory to make student assignment decisions, has resulted in
the current trend of racial segregation in public schools.24
Because of its disenfranchising effects, school districts seek
to eliminate the trend of de facto segregation.  Some argue that
de facto segregated schools should be integrated even when the
majority opposes integration because such segregation is “ ‘un-
acceptable by democratic principles even if it is often supported
18. Liu, supra note 14, at 290.
19. Nelson, supra note 3, at 299; see also Eboni S. Nelson, What Price Grutter?
We May Have Won the Battle, but Are We Losing the War?, 32 J.C. & U.L. 1, 8-9,
25-26 (2005).
20. Kim Forde-Mazrui, The Constitutional Implications of Race-Neutral Af-
firmative Action, 88 GEO. L.J. 2331, 2396-97 (2000); see also Nelson, supra note 3,
at 303-04 (“Greater numbers of African-American students fail to complete high
school as compared to white students.  African-American students, many of whom
attend racially imbalanced schools, routinely score lower than their white counter-
parts on standardized tests.  Fewer African-American adults, as compared to white
adults, obtain a college education.  Such achievement gaps are due, in part, to dis-
parities existing between the quality of the teachers at poor, minority-concentrated
schools and their more affluent, white counterparts.”).
21. Forde-Mazrui, supra note 20, at 2367.
22. Id. at 2396-97.
23. Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 127 S. Ct. 2738,
2802 (2007) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
24. Nelson, supra note 3, at 306-07.
4http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol29/iss1/6
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by democratic policies.’”25  If, rather than affirmatively repel
the effects of de facto segregation, school districts continue to
yield to societal pressures that oppose diversification and base
their student assignment policies upon racially segregated
housing patterns, the goal of attaining educational equality for
minority students will be unattainable.26
II. Strict Scrutiny’s Effect on Race-Conscious Efforts
in Education
In Regents of the University of California v. Bakke,27 Justice
Powell developed the idea that racial diversity in the context of
education is a compelling interest to adopt race-based initia-
tives.28  Justice Powell’s vision of diversity encompasses a broad
array of qualifications and characteristics, of which racial or
ethnic origin is a single and important element.29  While recog-
nizing the need of schools to foster racial diversity, Justice Pow-
ell was wary of the use of racial classifications, concluding that
racial or ethnic distinctions of any variety are inherently sus-
pect and require the most exacting judicial scrutiny.30  Applying
strict scrutiny to the plan at issue in Bakke, Justice Powell con-
cluded that the plan was unconstitutional because it was not
narrowly tailored.31  The Bakke plan reserved spots in each
class for minority students, the “functional equivalent of a
quota system,” rather than considering all the factors of an ap-
plicant, including race, during admissions.32
It was not until 1989, in City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson
Co.,33 that the Supreme Court ruled that all state initiated ra-
cial classifications, including those with benign objectives like
affirmative action, were presumptively invalid and subject to
strict scrutiny.34  The language of Croson suggested that affirm-
25. Siegel, supra note 11, at 824 (quoting AMY GUTMAN, DEMOCRATIC EDUCA-
TION 162 (1987)).
26. Nelson, supra note 3, at 310.
27. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
28. Id. at 311-15.
29. Id. at 315.
30. Id. at 291.
31. Id. at 320.
32. Id. at 318.
33. 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
34. Id. at 495.
5
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ative action was now abolished because any such program was
doomed to fail under a strict scrutiny analysis.35  However,
seven years later, in Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena,36 the
Court stated that “we wish to dispel the notion that strict scru-
tiny is ‘strict in theory, but fatal in fact.’ ”37  With this language,
the Court left open the possibility that a government imple-
mented program utilizing benign racial classifications may sur-
vive a strict scrutiny examination.
Such a result was realized in Grutter v. Bollinger,38 where
the Court upheld the use of race-based considerations in higher
education.39  In Grutter, Justice O’Connor, writing for the ma-
jority, reiterated that race-based classifications of all varieties
are subject to strict scrutiny.40  Justice O’Connor reached a con-
clusion similar to Justice Powell’s in Bakke, finding that the
University of Michigan School of Law’s use of race as a consider-
ation in admissions was supported by a compelling interest in
attaining a diverse student body.41  The Court also held that the
Grutter plan was narrowly tailored, because it made individual-
ized decisions that considered an applicant’s race and did not
make race a defining component of any student’s application.42
Strict scrutiny would, however, prove fatal for the benign
racial classification at issue in Gratz v. Bollinger.43  In Gratz,
the Court applied the Grutter standard in striking down the
race conscious admission policy of the University of Michigan’s
undergraduate program, where a fixed number of points based
on race were awarded to all minority applicants.44  The Court
found that this practice made race a defining feature of a stu-
dent’s application and, therefore, determined that the program
was not narrowly tailored.45
35. Forde-Mazrui, supra note 20, at 2338.
36. 515 U.S. 200 (1995).
37. Id. at 237 (quoting Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 507 (1980).
38. 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
39. Id. at 326.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 328.
42. Id. at 334, 337-41.
43. 539 U.S. 244 (2003).  This case was decided in conjunction with Grutter.
44. Id. at 270-71.
45. Id. at 271-72.
6http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol29/iss1/6
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III. Factual and Procedural History of the Seattle and
Jackson County Plans
A. History of the Seattle Plan
Racially segregated schools have never operated in Seattle
and the city’s districts have never been subjected to a court or-
dered desegregation mandate.  There is, however, a racially no-
table residency pattern in Seattle, with most white students
living in northern Seattle and the students of other races living
in the southern part of the city.46  The Seattle School District
assignment plan sought to address the segregating effects of
these racially isolated housing patterns on school enrollment.47
Seattle’s plan arose after nearly fifty years of effort to com-
bat racial segregation in Seattle.  Following an increase in the
black population in Seattle after World War II, the Seattle
school system found itself highly segregated.48  In response to
this racial isolation, the National Association for the Advance-
ment of Colored People (“NAACP”) and other community orga-
nizations succeeded in pressuring the Seattle School Board to
enact a race-based transfer policy.49 Unsatisfied with the re-
sults of Seattle’s efforts, the NAACP brought federal lawsuits
against the Seattle School Board in 1969 and 1977, which re-
sulted in a mandatory busing program designed to integrate Se-
attle schools.50  As a consequence of the busing program, white
families moved away from the Seattle city proper, and, over
time, there was a marked decrease in overall student enroll-
ment and an increase in the racial diversity of students in Seat-
tle schools.51  In the interest of attracting white students back
to city schools and providing greater school choice for students,
the Seattle School Board, in 1988, enacted a student assign-
ment plan similar to the one struck down in Parents Involved.52
The plan placed a heavy emphasis on race, using it as the sec-
46. Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 127 S. Ct. 2738,
2747 (2007).
47. Id.
48. Id. at 2802-03 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
49. Id. at 2803.
50. Id. at 2803-05.
51. Id. at 2805.
52. Id.
7
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ond factor in student assignments.53  In seeking to deemphasize
the use of race in student assignments, the Seattle School
Board enacted the plan at issue in 1996, and it began operation
in 1999.54
The Seattle School District’s new assignment plan gave in-
coming ninth graders the option of ranking the high schools
they wished to attend.55  If too many students ranked a particu-
lar school as their first choice, three tiebreakers were employed
to determine which students would enter that school.56  The
first tiebreaker considered whether a student had a sibling at
the school, the second tiebreaker factored in the racial composi-
tion of the school and the race of the individual student, and the
third tiebreaker took into account the student’s geographic
proximity to the school.57
The second tiebreaker was the aspect of the plan at issue in
Parents Involved.  Within Seattle’s District No. 1 at the time of
adjudication, forty-one percent of the students were classified
as white, and the remaining fifty-nine percent of students, of
varying racial composition, were classified as non-white.58  In
the event that a school was oversubscribed, and the first
tiebreaker did not resolve the issue, the district would examine
that school’s racial demographics.59  If the school’s racial bal-
ance was not ten percentage points within the district’s racial
balance—forty-one percent white and fifty-nine percent non-
white—the school would be labeled integration positive.60  The
district would then assign to that school those students whose
race would harmonize that school’s racial balance with that of
the district.61
B. History of the Jefferson County, Kentucky Plan
The Jefferson County School District operates in downtown
Louisville, Kentucky and, unlike the Seattle School District,
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 2747 (majority opinion).
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id.
8http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol29/iss1/6
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previously maintained a segregated school system.62  This fact
is important because the Supreme Court has previously recog-
nized that remedying the past effects of intentional discrimina-
tion is a compelling interest that supports the use of racial
classifications in education.63  A federal court enacted a desegre-
gation decree on Jefferson County in 1975, and the same court
removed the decree in 2000 after holding that the district had
eliminated segregation “[t]o the greatest extent practicable.”64
In 2001, Jefferson County enacted the student assignment
plan at issue in Parents Involved.65  This plan required all non-
magnet schools to maintain a black enrollment of fifteen per-
cent, at a minimum, or fifty percent, at a maximum.66  At the
time of adjudication, the district had 97,000 students, thirty-
four percent of whom were black and sixty-six percent of whom
were white.67  At the kindergarten level, students were desig-
nated to what the district termed a “resides” school based on
their residence.68  These schools were organized in various
groups in order to further racial integration.69
The district utilized two methods for assigning students to
these schools.70  Parents of kindergarteners, first graders, or
new students to the district could submit an application select-
ing their first and second choices of schools in their respective
cluster.71  Children whose parents did not submit an application
were assigned to a school in their respective cluster by the dis-
trict.72  The district based its assignments on available space
and the district’s racial guidelines of a fifteen percent minimum
or fifty percent maximum enrollment of black children in a par-
ticular school.73  If a certain school was close to being racially
imbalanced per the guidelines, the district would not assign a
62. Id. at 2749
63. Id. at 2752
64. Id. at 2749 (quoting Hampton v. Jefferson County Bd. of Educ., 102 F.
Supp.2d 358, 360 (W.D. Ky. 2000)).
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id.
9
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student to that school if the student’s race would contribute to
racial imbalance in that school.74  Once assigned to a school,
students of all grades could apply for transfer to another school
for many reasons, but those transfers could be denied due to
lack of available space or in consideration of the racial
guidelines.75
C. Procedural History of the Seattle Plan
Parents Involved in Community Schools (“Parents In-
volved”) is a non-profit corporation comprised of parents of chil-
dren who have been or might have been denied acceptance to
the high school of their choice in the Seattle District due to the
racial tiebreaker.76  Parents Involved brought suit against the
Seattle School District in the Western District of Washington,
alleging that the district’s use of the racial tiebreaker violated
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, Ti-
tle IV of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and the Washington Civil
Rights Act.77  The district court granted summary judgment for
the school district, holding that “state law did not bar the dis-
trict’s use of the racial tiebreaker and that the plan survived
strict scrutiny on the federal constitutional claim because it was
narrowly tailored to serve a compelling government interest.”78
The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s ruling, based
on its understanding of the Washington Civil Rights Act,79 and
enjoined the district’s use of the racial tiebreaker.80  However,
the Ninth Circuit withdrew this decision, because the assign-
ments for the upcoming school year would occur before the reso-
lution of the case,81 and certified the Washington Civil Rights
Act question to the Washington Supreme Court.82  The Wash-
74. Id. at 2749-50.
75. Id. at 2750.
76. Id. at 2748.
77. Id.
78. Id. (citing Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 137
F. Supp. 2d 1224, 1240 (W.D. Wash. 2001)).
79. Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 285 F.3d 1236,
1253 (9th Cir. 2002).
80. Id. at 1257.
81. Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 294 F.3d 1085,
1086 (9th Cir. 2002).
82. Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 294 F.3d 1084,
1085 (9th Cir. 2002).
10http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol29/iss1/6
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ington Supreme Court upheld the district’s racial tiebreaker
holding, that the Washington State Civil Rights Act does not
bar programs that are racially neutral, such as the district’s ra-
cial tiebreaker.83  The case then returned to the Ninth Circuit
and the court reversed the district court’s ruling on the federal
constitutional question.  The court determined that, although
the school district’s use of the racial tiebreaker was supported
by compelling interests, its application was not narrowly tai-
lored.84  The Ninth Circuit reheard the case en banc and over-
ruled the Ninth Circuit panel’s decision, finding that the use of
the racial tiebreaker was narrowly tailored to further its com-
pelling interests.85
D. Procedural History of the Jackson County, Kentucky Plan
Crystal Meredith brought suit against the Jackson County
School District in the Western District of Kentucky, alleging
that the school district’s plan violated the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.86  Her suit came after
the school district denied her request to have her son trans-
ferred to an elementary school closer to her residence because
his attendance at that school would negatively affect that
school’s racial balance.87
The district court upheld the challenged assignment plan,
finding “that Jefferson County had asserted a compelling inter-
est in maintaining racially diverse schools, and that the assign-
ment plan was (in all relevant respects) narrowly tailored to
serve that compelling interest.”88  On appeal, the Sixth Circuit
affirmed the district court’s ruling in a per curiam opinion.  The
Sixth Circuit relied on the district court’s reasoning and did not
83. Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No.1, 72 P.3d 151, 166
(Wash. 2003) (en banc).
84. Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 377 F.3d 949,
964, 980 (9th Cir. 2004).
85. Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 426 F.3d 1162,
1192-93 (9th Cir. 2005) (en banc).
86. Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 127 S. Ct. 2738,
2750 (2007).
87. Id.
88. Id. (citing McFarland v. Jefferson County Pub. Sch., 330 F. Supp. 2d 834,
837 (W.D. Ky. 2004)).
11
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issue a written opinion because doing so “would serve no useful
purpose.”89
IV. Supreme Court Opinions in Parents Involved v. Seattle
School District No. 1
A. The Majority Opinion
The Supreme Court granted certiorari for both cases90 and
decided them concurrently because both concerned the same ul-
timate question, “whether a public school that had not operated
legally segregated schools91 or has been found to be unitary92
may choose to classify students by race and rely upon that clas-
sification in making school assignments.”93  Chief Justice Rob-
erts, writing for the majority,94 began the review of the plans by
noting that there are only two recognized interests that serve as
compelling when reviewing the constitutionality of racial classi-
fications in education: “remedying the effects of past intentional
discrimination”95 and “the interest in diversity in higher educa-
tion upheld in Grutter.”96
The majority found that neither plan was supported by ei-
ther of these compelling interests.97  Fundamentally, because
the plans at issue were aimed at elementary and secondary edu-
cation, as opposed to higher education, the Grutter interest
could not apply.98  In addition, both plans were not aimed at
remedying past discrimination: Seattle schools were never seg-
89. Id. (citing McFarland v. Jefferson County Pub. Sch., 416 F.3d 513, 514
(6th Cir. 2005)).
90. Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 547 U.S. 1177
(2006).
91. The majority’s reference here is to the Seattle School District, which had
never been legally deemed to operate intentionally segregated schools. Id. at 2747.
92. The majority’s reference here is to the Jefferson County School District,
which, in 1975, was found to have operated segregated schools. Id. at 2749.  In
2000, it was determined that the school system had been effectively desegregated.
Id. at 2749.
93. Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2746.
94. The majority consisted of Justices Alito, Roberts, Scalia, and Thomas.
Justice Kennedy concurred with the majority opinion, disagreeing with the reason-
ing, but joining in result.
95. Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2752.
96. Id. at 2753.
97. Id. at 2752, 2754.
98. Id. at 2754.
12http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol29/iss1/6
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regated by law or subjected to a desegregation order; and Jeffer-
son County’s desegregation decree had since been dissolved,
and the district did “not rely upon an interest in remedying the
effects of past intentional discrimination in defending its pre-
sent use of race in assigning students.”99  The Grutter compel-
ling interest, as interpreted by the majority, is designed “to
ensure that the use of racial classifications was indeed part of a
broader assessment of diversity, and not simply an effort to
achieve racial balance.”100  The majority found that neither plan
considered race as an element of a broader vision of diversity,
but rather that they considered “race exclusively in white/non-
white terms in Seattle and black/‘other’ terms in Jefferson
County.”101
In addition, neither plan met the majority’s standard for
being necessary and narrowly tailored “to the goal of achieving
the educational and social benefits asserted to flow from racial
diversity.”102  Each of the districts tailored their plans only to
mirror “each district’s specific racial demographics, rather than
. . . any pedagogic concept of the level of diversity needed to
obtain the asserted educational benefits.”103  Also, no evidence
was offered to indicate that the racial demographics of either
district provided a measure of the diversity necessary to benefit
students in secondary education.104
The majority viewed this demographically determined at-
tempt at diversity as “working backward to achieve a particular
type of racial balance.”105  The idea that racial balancing serves
as an interest in and of itself, the majority reiterated, is “pa-
tently unconstitutional.”106  This reasoning could serve as the
most important statement by the majority in the holding, be-
cause it attacks the idea of trying to eliminate the effects of de
facto segregation.  The Seattle School Board defended its plan
“as necessary to address the consequences of racially identifi-
99. Id. at 2752.
100. Id. at 2753.
101. Id. at 2754.
102. Id. at 2755.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 2756.
105. Id. at 2757.
106. Id. (quoting Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 330 (2003)).
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able housing patterns.”107  The majority rejected this argument,
stating integration efforts do not require racial proportional-
ity.108  If allowed, racial balancing will have “no logical stopping
point”109 and “effectively assure that race will always be rele-
vant in American life.”110
The plans were also unnecessary in that they had little ef-
fect on student assignments in either district.111  In the major-
ity’s view, “the minimal impact of the districts’ racial
classifications on school enrollment casts doubt on the necessity
of using racial classifications.”112  Moreover, “[n]arrow tailoring
requires ‘serious, good faith consideration of workable race-neu-
tral alternatives,’” and, in the majority’s view, the districts
failed to show that they considered measures other than racial
classifications to achieve classroom diversity.113
B. Justice Breyer’s Dissenting Opinion
In his dissent, Justice Breyer advocated the application of a
more contextual standard of analysis, as opposed to a fatal
strict scrutiny review, for race-based classifications that seek to
107. Id. at 2758.
108. Id. at 2759.
109. Id. at 2758 (quoting Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 498
(1989)).
110. Id. (quoting Croson, 488 U.S. at 495).
111. Id. at 2759-60.  With regard to the Seattle plan, the Court stated:
In over one-third of the assignments affected by the racial tiebreaker, then,
the use of race in the end made no difference, and the district could identify
only 52 students who were ultimately affected adversely by the racial
tiebreaker in that it resulted in assignment to a school they had not listed as
a preference and to which they would not otherwise have been assigned.
Id.  The Court made a similar finding concerning the effect of the Jefferson County
plan:
Elementary school students are assigned to their first- or second-choice
school 95 percent of the time, and transfers, which account for roughly 5
percent of assignments, are only denied 35 percent of the time—and pre-
sumably an even smaller percentage are denied on the basis of the racial
guidelines, given that other factors may lead to a denial.  Jefferson County
estimates that the racial guidelines account for only 3 percent of
assignments.
Id. at 2760 (citation omitted).
112. Id. at 2760.
113. Id. (quoting Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 339 (2003)).
14http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol29/iss1/6
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include, rather than exclude.114  However, in light of the prece-
dent established by Grutter,115 Bakke,116 and other cases, Jus-
tice Breyer subjected the two plans at issue to the traditional
strict scrutiny test.117  Under this exacting evaluation, Justice
Breyer concluded that each plan was narrowly tailored to fur-
ther compelling governmental interests and, therefore, was
constitutional.118
In finding the plans constitutionally valid, Justice Breyer
articulated three compelling interests furthered by the Seattle
and Jefferson County plans.119  First, the plans sought to “right
the consequences of prior conditions of segregation,”120 includ-
ing effects on “housing patterns, employment practices, eco-
nomic conditions, and social attitudes.”121  Second, there was
“an interest in overcoming the adverse educational effects pro-
duced by and associated with highly segregated schools.”122  Fi-
nally, the plans advanced “an interest in producing an
114. Id. at 2816-20 (Breyer, J., dissenting).  Justice Breyer, joined by Justices
Ginsburg, Souter, and Stevens, articulated the contextual approach as:
The view that a more lenient standard than ‘strict scrutiny’ should ap-
ply in the present context would not imply abandonment of judicial efforts
carefully to determine the need for race-conscious criteria and the criteria’s
tailoring in light of the need.  And the present context requires a court to
examine carefully the race-conscious program at issue.  In doing so, a re-
viewing judge must be fully aware of the potential dangers and pitfalls that
Justice Thomas and Justice Kennedy mention.
But unlike the plurality, such a judge would also be aware that a legis-
lature or school administrators, ultimately accountable to the electorate,
could nonetheless properly conclude that a racial classification sometimes
serves a purpose important enough to overcome the risks they mention, for
example, helping to end racial isolation or to achieve a diverse student body
in public schools.  Where that is so, the judge would carefully examine the
program’s details to determine whether the use of race-conscious criteria is
proportionate to the important ends it serves.
Id. at 2819 (citations omitted).
115. 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
116. Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
117. Id.  Justice Breyer thus framed the issue as “whether the school boards
in Seattle and Louisville adopted these plans to serve a ‘compelling governmental
interest’ and, if so, whether the plans are ‘narrowly tailored’ to achieve that inter-
est.” Id.
118. Id. at 2820, 2824.
119. Id. at 2820.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id.
15
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educational environment that reflects the ‘pluralistic society’ in
which our children will live.”123  Unlike the majority and Justice
Kennedy, in his concurring opinion, Justice Breyer found the
plans to be narrowly tailored in multiple respects.124  Each plan
applied a narrow use of race, utilized other non-race related cri-
teria, had histories of development and modification, compared
favorably to other desegregation plans across the country, and
lacked any reasonable and non-race conscious alternatives.125
Justice Breyer took particular exception to the majority’s
distinction between de jure and de facto segregation.126  Be-
cause many schools in the South that were allegedly segregated
by law voluntarily desegregated their schools without a court
order or submitted voluntary desegregation plans to be followed
after a segregation decree was dissolved, “a court finding of de
jure segregation cannot be a crucial variable.”127  In addition,
the de jure and de facto distinction only concerns what desegre-
gation measures school boards are constitutionally required to
implement, rather than what desegregation plans they are al-
lowed to undertake.128  Justice Breyer could find no example of
a prior Court decision that “relied upon the de jure/de facto dis-
tinction in order to limit what a school district is voluntarily
allowed to do.”129  As de facto segregation becomes an increasing
problem, Justice Breyer concluded that “such resegregation can
create serious educational, social, and civic problems,”130 and
that the majority’s holding deprives school districts of the abil-
123. Id. at 2821 (quoting Swann v. Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 16
(1971)).
124. Id. at 2824.
125. Id. at 2829-30.
126. Id. at 2803, 2810, 2823.
127. Id. at 2810.
128. Id. at 2823.
129. Id. (alteration in original).
130. Id. at 2833.  Justice Breyer relies on a number of statistical sources to
support the notion that de facto resegregation is increasing and is reflected in the
racial proportionality of the nation’s schools. See C. CLOTFELTER, AFTER BROWN:
THE RISE AND RETREAT OF SCHOOL DESEGREGATION 56 (2004); FRANKENBERG ET AL.,
supra note 16, at 30; G. ORFIELD & C. LEE, THE CIVIL RIGHTS PROJECT, HARVARD
UNIVERSITY, RACIAL TRANSFORMATION AND THE CHANGING NATURE OF SEGREGATION
18 (Jan. 2006), available at http://www.civilrightsproject.ucla.edu/research/deseg/
Racial_Transformation.pdf.
16http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol29/iss1/6
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ity to combat de facto segregation with broad race-conscious as-
signment policies.131
C. Justice Kennedy’s Concurring Opinion
In Grutter, Justice Kennedy offered a concurring opinion
that was wary of the majority’s decision to uphold the use of
race-based admissions considerations.  Justice Kennedy’s disa-
greement with the majority did not concern the explicit use of
race, but that it had been used too much.  He understood Jus-
tice Powell, in Bakke, as permitting the use of “ ‘race as one,
non-predominant factor in a system designed to consider each
applicant as an individual,’ a use that was ‘modest’ and ‘lim-
ited.’”132  In what may likely prove to be the most useful opinion
of Parents Involved,133  Justice Kennedy again reiterated his
opinion on this issue by concurring with the majority.  Justice
Kennedy found that although the plans were supported by com-
pelling interests, they failed to satisfy the narrow tailoring as-
pect of the strict scrutiny test.134
Rejecting the majority’s insistence that the Constitution
mandates school districts to ignore the issue of de facto segrega-
tion in education,135 Justice Kennedy found that “[a] compelling
interest exists in avoiding racial isolation, an interest that a
school district, in its discretion and expertise, may choose to
pursue.”136  School boards may consider students’ races, along
with other, demographic factors, in pursuit of that interest.137
Justice Kennedy’s determination was in part based on a com-
parison with the rationale of Grutter.138  Because the real world
is not color blind, despite noble aspirations to make it so,139 “it is
permissible to consider the racial makeup of schools and to
131. Id.
132. Siegel, supra note 11, at 800.
133. See Leslie Yalof Garfield, The Glass is Half Full: Envisioning the Future
of Race Preference Policies, 63 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 385, 388, 416 (2008).
134. Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2792 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
135. Id. at 2791.
136. Id. at 2797.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 2792.
139. Id. at 2791-92 (citing Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896)
(Harlan, J., dissenting)).
17
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adopt general policies to encourage a diverse student body, one
aspect of which is its racial composition.”140
Although Justice Kennedy maintained that each plan was
supported by a compelling interest, he found that both plans
were not narrowly tailored.  Governments that utilize racial
classifications have the burden of demonstrating exactly how
decisions based on a person’s race are made in the challenged
program.141  Justice Kennedy found that Jefferson County failed
to meet this burden, because it “explained how and when it em-
ploys [racial] classifications only in terms so broad and impre-
cise that they cannot withstand strict scrutiny.”142 Specifically,
Jefferson County failed to explain which personnel make the
race-based decisions, who oversees the operation of the plan,
the exact circumstances under which a race-based assignment
may or may not be made, or how the district would decide which
of two children with similar backgrounds would be subjected to
a race-based determination.143  Considering these ambiguities,
Jefferson County did not clearly demonstrate that it relied on
narrowly tailored racial classifications, as opposed to a broad
and forbidden form of racial categorization.144
Justice Kennedy felt that the Seattle School District more
clearly and specifically described the methods and criteria used
to make race-based assignments in its plan.145  However, he,
like the majority, took issue with the manner in which Seattle
categorized the race of students within its district.146  The Seat-
tle district “failed to explain why, in a district composed of a
diversity of races, with fewer than half of the students classified
as ‘white,’ it has employed the crude racial categories of ‘white’
and ‘non-white’ as the basis for its assignment decisions.”147
While Justice Kennedy agreed with Seattle in believing that the
interests for the plan were compelling, the district failed to
demonstrate to Justice Kennedy “how, in the context of its di-
140. Id. at 2792.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 2789-90.
143. Id. at 2790.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 2790-91.
147. Id.
18http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol29/iss1/6
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verse student population, a blunt distinction between ‘white’
and ‘non-white’ furthers these goals.”148
Additionally, Justice Kennedy stated that school boards
may employ racial classifications in the interest of furthering
racial diversity “only if they are a last resort.”149  Both school
boards failed to demonstrate that their plans utilized race-
based assignments because there was no other way to confront
the issue of de facto racial isolation.150  In addressing this
shortfall, Justice Kennedy articulated some race neutral pro-
grams that school districts should implement before determin-
ing that plans utilizing racial classifications are necessary.
Such programs include: strategic school site selection, organiza-
tion of attendance zones in consideration of neighborhood
demographics, reserving resources to establish special pro-
grams, recruiting students and faculty in a targeted manner,
and tracking matriculation, academic achievement, and other
statistics by race.151
After pursuing such alternatives, school boards could then,
if necessary, implement “a more nuanced, individual evaluation
of school needs and student characteristics that might include
race as a component.”152  Such a program would be guided by
the standards of Grutter, and the criteria would have to vary
according to student age, parental needs, and the function of
the schools.153  However, in order to satisfy Justice Kennedy
and thus, theoretically, be constitutional, a school board must
draft any race conscious plan in a “general way and without
treating each student in different fashion solely on the basis of a
systematic, individual typing by race.”154
V. Saving These Efforts: Reconciling Justice
Kennedy’s Critiques
Justice Kennedy hints that race-conscious assignment
plans may pass constitutional muster only after various race-
148. Id. at 2791.
149. Id. at 2792.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 2793.
153. Id.
154. Id. at 2792.
19
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neutral alternatives are exhausted.  However, the programs
Justice Kennedy describes, such as “allocating resources for
special programs,”155 have been administered and have failed to
stop the current trend of de facto segregation.  In support of the
Seattle and Louisville plans, Justice Breyer stated that
“[n]othing in the extensive history of desegregation efforts over
the past 50 years gives the districts, or this Court, any reason to
believe that another method is possible to accomplish these
goals.”156  In particular, Justice Breyer associates Justice Ken-
nedy’s recommendation of “allocating resources for special pro-
grams” with “magnet schools.”157  Such resource-rich magnet
schools provided Seattle and Louisville with only a “limited de-
segregation effect”158 and thus it follows that “there is no evi-
dence from the experience of these school districts that [such
programs] will make any meaningful impact.”159  Through Jus-
tice Kennedy’s own suggestion of race-neutral alternatives,
which have been implemented with little effect, it is evident
that race-conscious efforts are the only viable solution to the
problem of racial isolation in public schools.
As Justice Breyer admits, “I have found no example or
model that would permit this Court to say to Seattle and to Lou-
isville: ‘Here is an instance of a desegregation plan that is likely
to achieve your objectives and also makes less use of race-con-
scious criteria that your plans.’”160  If no existing plans are more
narrowly tailored than those of Seattle and Jackson County,
and if both those plans are unconstitutional, then how may a
155. Id.
156. Id. at 2828 (Breyer, J., dissenting).  According to Justice Breyer, Justice
Kennedy articulates the goals as “avoiding forced busing, countering white flight,
[and] maintaining racial diversity.” Id.
157. Id.  Justice Breyer addresses each of Justice Kennedy’s race-neutral al-
ternatives.  Concerning “strategic site selection” for new schools, Justice Breyer
points out that “Seattle has built one new high school in the last 44 years.” Id.
The effort of “drawing” neighborhood “attendance zones” only worked in Louisville
when it was combined with forced busing. Id.  Each district has previously exer-
cised the “recruiting faculty” option, “but only as one part of a broader program.”
Id.   Justice Breyer dismisses the suggested effort of “tracking enrollments, per-
formance, and other statistics by race” because “tracking reveals the problem; it
does not cure it.” Id.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 2827.
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school board adopt a race-conscious student assignment plan
without violating the Constitution?
The reasons Justice Kennedy articulates for striking down
the Seattle and Jefferson County plans serve as a guide for
school districts that will consider such race conscious desegre-
gation efforts in the future.  An application of Justice Kennedy’s
criticisms of each plan demonstrates how those particular
school boards may have organized and articulated their pro-
grams in a fashion meeting Justice Kennedy’s standard for nar-
row tailoring.  This analysis offers an avenue for school districts
to continue to utilize race-conscious efforts in the battle against
de facto segregation in a constitutional fashion.161
As a threshold matter, school districts should avoid utiliz-
ing racial demographic statistics as the guidelines for their pro-
grams.  Jefferson County relied on racial assignments when
student-selected schools had student populations above or be-
low a certain racial threshold.  Each school in the district was
allowed a fifteen percent minimum or fifty percent maximum
black student enrollment.  If a child’s race would contribute
negatively to a school’s adherence to the racial demographic,
the child would not be assigned to that school.162  Seattle also
relied on numerical demographics to dictate its race-conscious
assignments.  If the population of a school was not within ten
percentage points of being forty-one percent white and fifty-
nine percent non-white, the district would assign to that school
those students whose race would contribute to a racial harmo-
nizing of that school’s population.163
As indicated by the Parents Involved decision, a plan to
combat de facto segregation that utilizes race as an active con-
sideration will almost certainly be found unconstitutional if its
goal is based on a strict racial percentage.  According to the
Court in Grutter, a school’s attempt to guarantee that a specific
percentage of a racial or ethnic group will comprise a student
161. This theory is premised on the idea that, since Justice Kennedy already
finds public school diversity to be a compelling interest, if Justice Kennedy were to
find that a desegregation plan was narrowly tailored, he would join the instant
case’s dissenters as the majority in validating that plan.  In such a case, Justices
Alito, Roberts, Scalia, and Thomas would form the dissenting side, since they
formed the solid majority here.
162. Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2749-50 (majority opinion).
163. Id. at 2747.
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body is unconstitutional racial balancing.164  Such balancing can
be compared to a quota, where the individual is insulated from
comparison with other students for the available positions in a
particular school.165  If, however, a school defines its program
more abstractly and in reference to the educational benefits of-
fered by diversity, then such a program may be constitutionally
permissible.166  Justice Kennedy endorsed such a position in
Parents Involved, stating that “it is permissible [for school
boards] to consider the racial makeup of schools and to adopt
general policies to encourage a diverse student body, one aspect
of which is its racial composition.”167  Thus, the Constitution al-
lows school districts to consider race as a general or plus factor,
while guaranteeing that each student competes with the other
applicants.168
This suggestion offers little guidance as to how to actually
proceed, but does delineate how not to fashion a program that
utilizes racial classifications.  The resulting programs may yield
the same results or function in the same fashion as an unconsti-
tutional plan, but they would be framed in a way that may sur-
vive strict scrutiny.  For example, if both the Seattle and
Jefferson County school districts had avoided the goal of match-
ing the racial populations of their schools to the racial demo-
graphic of their communities, the plans may have been found
more narrowly tailored to achieve the goal of diversity.  School
boards nationwide should take heed and avoid a desired per-
centage of a particular racial component in a student
population.
How schools should characterize a desired level of diversity
so as to comply with the constitution is an abstract question
that is best left defined in an abstract fashion.  As the Univer-
sity of Michigan School of Law demonstrated in Grutter, an in-
tegration goal need not be framed in terms of percentages.  In
conjunction with the interests of need, ability, geographic prox-
imity, and interest of study, school districts can utilize a race
factor so long as it is one element of overall consideration given
164. Nelson, supra note 3, at 322.
165. Id. at 323.
166. Id. at 322.
167. Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2792 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
168. Nelson, supra note 3, at 323.
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to a particular student’s assignment.  Such a consideration
would allow school districts to make their assignments and
maintain a desired sense of scholastic diversity.
Concerning the plans at issue in Parents Involved, Justice
Kennedy took issue with the manner in which Jefferson County
exacted its race-based decisions.  Specifically, the Jefferson
County program was ambiguous in a variety of areas, such as
what personnel made the race-based assignment decisions, who
oversaw the plan’s implementation, what exactly were the cir-
cumstances that dictated when a race-based assignment would
be made, or how race would be applied in a situation between
two children with similar backgrounds.169  Seattle’s plan failed
to satisfy Justice Kennedy because it used the classifications
“white” and “non-white” in a district whose population com-
prised a variety of different ethnic groups.170
These deficiencies mean that schools must be very specific
as to how their respective plans are organized and adminis-
tered.  The Seattle district should have sought to ensure some
vision of diversity within its various schools.  This could have
been achieved in a fashion similar to that found in Grutter.  The
school board could examine the populations of each high school
during assignment time.  In the event that too many students
requested attendance at a certain school, the board could then
consider the variety of factors such as address, presence of sib-
ling, academic strengths and, lastly, race in deciding how to
best assign those students to a school.  Jackson County’s plan
may have been saved had its organization and procedures not
been so ambiguous.  The district should have assigned a partic-
ular administrator to be in charge of these sensitive assignment
decisions.  Oversight should have been provided by the school
boards or some fixed group to ensure the race-based decisions
were limited in scope.  The district needed to more clearly artic-
ulate its procedures for making race-based decisions, specifi-
cally when such decisions would be resorted to as the final
factor in assigning students to schools.  Given the result of Par-
ents Involved, race should have only been utilized as a factor in
reference to a student’s entire identity.  In the face of competi-
169. Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2789-90 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
170. Id. at 2790-91.
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tion amongst students for spots, the district should have fash-
ioned a manner of individualized determinations to make its
assignment decisions.  Such a system would view the student’s
race as a single important aspect, rather than the deciding
determination.
VI. Conclusion
Despite “[t]he enduring hope that race should not matter;
the reality is that too often it does.”171  Presently, the United
States is in the grip of a sweeping de facto segregation phenom-
enon.  Justice Kennedy articulates that this is not a trend
Americans must begrudgingly accept.  “To the extent the plural-
ity opinion suggests the Constitution mandates that state and
local authorities must accept the status quo of racial isolation in
schools, it is, in my view, profoundly mistaken.”172  In conclud-
ing his opinion, Justice Kennedy stated that “those entrusted
with directing our public schools can bring to bear the creativity
of experts, parents, administrators, and other concerned citi-
zens to find a way to achieve the compelling interests they face
without resorting to widespread governmental allocation of ben-
efits and burdens on the basis of racial classifications.”173  One
may interpret these words as a pronouncement effectively end-
ing the use of racial classifications in secondary education.
However, there is an alternative view to this statement.  Justice
Kennedy’s reference to “widespread governmental allocation”
means, when considered with the rest of his opinion, that it is
only those broad and irresponsible uses of benign racial classifi-
cations that are forbidden.
Thus, Justice Kennedy’s opinion in Parents Involved serves
as a roadmap for school districts to battle de facto segregation
with race-conscious means.  By mandating that such race-con-
scious measures be as narrowly defined and applied as possible,
Justice Kenney does not forbid their use.  In the interest of fos-
tering the notion of diversity in the most fertile of soils, secon-
dary education, school districts must take heed and continue
their noble efforts against de facto segregation, within the lim-
its Justice Kennedy prescribes.
171. Id. at 2791.
172. Id.
173. Id. at 2797.
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